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The need for more dramatic targets has led to the new and somewhat exaggerated emphasis on a unilateral right 
of pre-emptive self-defence by the United States. What is most striking about the new US policy is that it 
portrays state-sponsored terrorism and rogue states possessing weapons of mass destruction as a new problem, 
and unilateral action as the only way of dealing with them. It is dangerous to marginalise the UN and increase 
the role of multilateral global coalitions or unilateral action in policing “evil-doing” as this has the potential to 
supplant what initially was designed as the role of the United Nations. If decisions regarding the use of force 
become nationalised, this may lead to anarchic, piecemeal, random, and unilateral enforcement of the desirable 
shared goal of stamping out terrorism.
Introduction
The early 1990s marked the end of the Cold War, which paralysed the United Nations from its 
inception. The event was a cause for celebration and hope. Following the historic Security 
Council Summit Meeting of January 1992, the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, spoke of a growing conviction “among nations large and small, that 
an opportunity has been regained to achieve the great objectives of the UN Charter—a United 
Nations capable of maintaining international peace and security, of securing justice and 
human rights and of promoting, in the words of the Charter, ‘social progress and better 
standards of life in larger freedom’.”1 The spirit of this bold and idealistic statement had been 
echoed two years earlier by former President George H W Bush Sr’s statement to the United 
Nations General Assembly as United States and coalition forces were gathering to push 
Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi army out of Kuwait:
We have a vision of a new partnership of nations that transcends the Cold War. A partnership based 
on consultation, cooperation, and collective action, especially through international and regional 
*
 LL.B (Hons)(Moi), LL.M (Hons) (Cantab), PhD (Melb), Lecturer in law, School of Law, University of 
Newcastle.
1
 Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organisation, UN GAOR, 47th Sess, UN Doc A/47/277, 
S/24111 (1992) para 3.
2organisations. A partnership united by principle and the rule of law … A partnership whose goals are 
to increase democracy, increase prosperity, increase the peace, and reduce arms.2
Over a decade after “Operation Desert Storm” and in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, a newly assertive United States has placed considerable strain on the 
existing international legal rules governing the use of force by reserving a right to use 
unilateral force and off course demonstrating that practically. Reacting to the legalities and 
justifications surrounding “Operation Iraqi Freedom”, Professors Richard Falk and David 
Kreiger observe: 
There are two main ways to ruin the UN: to ignore its relevance in war/peace situations, or to turn it 
into a rubber stamp for geopolitical operations of dubious status under international law or the UN 
Charter. Before September 11, Bush pursued the former approach; since then—by calling on the UN 
to provide the world’s remaining superpower with its blessings for an unwarranted war—the latter.3
The crusade against terror is not a sole US enterprise; many of its fears are shared by a large 
majority of the international community. The crusade should however not be allowed to numb 
states and the broader international community to the need of international rule of law and the 
utility of international law as central pillars of the international community. The attempt by 
the “Bush administration to introduce a new principle of international law permitting ‘pre-
emptive strike’ by a nation against another, solely at its own discretion, represents a quantum, 
and highly dangerous, innovation. Were such a principle to prevail, we would have reversed 
decades of advances, modest but hard won, toward peace-making and returned to an era of 
dominance through might.”4
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3The “War on Terror” is a noble crusade that seeks to counter the rise of international terrorism 
fuelled by a combination of resurgent religious extremism, well-financed and co-ordinated 
terrorist organisations, and the availability of cheap weapons technology. However the 
pugnacity demonstrated by the Bush Administration in facing the threat is a source of 
concern. In profound insight, in 1999, Hubert Vedrine, then Foreign Minister of France, 
coined a new term describing the United States as a “hyper-puissance”, or “hyper-power”.5
The term wasn’t an expression of awe but rather a fear of the capacity of the United States to 
resort to unilateralism in view of its dominant military and economic power. Perhaps the 
prophesy is coming true with events subsequent to the September 11 attacks painting a 
disturbing picture. 
This Article seeks to sketch generally the issues that America’s “for us or against us” attitude 
in the crusade against terror raises. Underpinning this commentary is the author’s conviction 
that the US stance will have injurious consequences for world public order if the existing 
international system based on a tenuous rule of law-based framework is allowed to morph into 
a rule of might. The author acknowledges that there are many legal and political issues 
regarding post September 11 United States actions, but these have been analysed 
comprehensively by the author elsewhere.6 In this Article, the author deliberately adopts a 
narrow perspective focusing on the danger that the overall tenor of United States’ actions 
portends.
5
 ‘To Paris, US Looks Like a “Hyperpower” ’, International Herald Tribune, 5 February 1999 at 5.
6
 Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, ‘Rushing to Break the Law? “The Bush Doctrine” of Pre-Emptive Strikes and The 
UN Charter Regime on The Use of Force’, (2003) 7 University of Western Sydney Law Review 1; Jackson 
Nyamuya Maogoto, ‘War on The Enemy: Self-Defence and State-Sponsored Terrorism’, (2003) 4 Melbourne 
Journal of International Law 406; Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, ‘New Frontiers, Old Problems: The War on 
Terror and the Notion of Anticipating the Enemy’, Netherlands International Law Review (forthcoming 2004); 
Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, ‘Countering Terrorism-From Wigged Judges to Helmeted Soldiers? An Evaluation 
of the Law Enforcement and Conflict Management Approaches’, Arizona Journal of International and 
Comparative Law (Forthcoming, 2004).
4The UN and Terrorism-An Awkward Embrace
Modern forms of terrorism began in earnest in the 1960s with the world emerging from 
colonialism and state-sponsored racism.7 From Asia to Africa and the Middle East, many 
states that sought freedom from foreign control and/or domination. In the face of vastly 
superior, well-equipped and financed imperial armies, nationalist and anticolonialist 
organisations resorted to terror violence, attacking civilian targets to instil a sense of terror in 
the white community and white-dominated governments that ruled by force. With few 
members, limited firepower, and comparatively few organisational resources, these groups 
opted to rely on dramatic, often spectacular, bloody acts of violence to attract attention to 
themselves and their cause. In this era “…‘terrorism’ was used to describe the violence 
perpetrated by indigenous nationalist, anticolonialist organisations that arose throughout Asia, 
Africa, and the Middle East in opposition to continued European rule.”8 Many countries owe 
their independence at least in part to nationalist movements that used terrorism. Various 
disenfranchised or exiled nationalist minorities also embraced terrorism as a means to draw 
attention to their plight and generate international support for their cause. This modus 
operandi did work and occasionally paid handsome dividends.9
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Ideological and geopolitical differences between states regarding the permissibility of 
violence in various political contexts ensured that no broad generic approach would be taken 
and obscured the fact that numerous states and organisations resort to clearly impermissible 
violence when convenient to or desirable for their objectives. The growing lethality and 
regularity of terrorist acts however transformed the matter as ideological motivations 
increasingly replaced revolutionary goals. This convinced the international community of the 
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6jurisdiction on all states to prosecute them, or alternatively an obligation to extradite persons 
charged with such acts to other states for prosecution. 
In order to mobilise consensus, the international community adopted a piecemeal approach to 
combating terrorism, choosing to target very specific acts of terrorism, occurring in specific 
situations, circumstances or places and generally providing for extradition and prosecution 
regimes. The first terrorism conventions related to aviation security and followed a spate of 
hijackings in the 1970s. They covered hostage taking, internationally protected persons 
(including diplomats), and nuclear material. In the 1980s, the focus was on maritime 
terrorism, following the hijacking of the Achille Lauro. It was not until December 1985 that 
the UN General Assembly finally condemned “unequivocally ... as criminal, all acts, methods 
and practices of terrorism.”12 Even that resolution, however, reaffirmed each people’s 
inalienable right to self-determination and the legitimacy of struggles against colonial and 
racist regimes and other forms of alien domination. Many state representatives affirmed the 
right to engage in all necessary actions in these struggles. Subsequently, three further 
conventions, on plastic explosives, terrorist bombings and terrorist financing, were negotiated 
in the 1990s wrapping up efforts under the aegis of the UN to address and combat terrorism in 
the 20th century.13
The law enforcement approach initially predominated counter-terrorism responses. This 
approach considers terrorist events as purely criminal acts to be addressed by the domestic 
criminal justice system and its components. It ensures due process and is a more precise 
instrument for meting out individualised justice. Despite the clear-cut positives that the 
domestic legal enforcement framework offers, it has proved to be inadequate. In the mid-
1980s States (notably Israel and the United States) begin to suggest that terrorist acts might be 
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7approached from a conflict management perspective, rather than exclusively from a law 
enforcement viewpoint. The belief is that only the use of armed force will result in the degree 
of decisive action that will minimise the likelihood that offenders will go unpunished. It is 
argued that terrorists must be seen, not as criminals, but as persons jeopardizing national 
security.14
With the end of the Cold War, acts generally described as “terrorism” proliferated in 
frequency and severity. The rise of globalisation and religious extremism on one hand, and 
the increasing accessibility and availability of weapons and technology on the other enabled 
well-financed and organised terrorist organisations to transform themselves into global outfits 
with greater reach and lethality.15 The appeal of terrorism as a low-cost, relatively low-risk, 
activity with possibilities of high yield in terms of publicity, weakening of the victim or 
infliction of harm has always been the primary magnet to terror outfits.16 Globalisation and 
technology was quickly enhancing the capabilities of the outfits. With less confrontation and 
more cooperation between states in the post-Cold War era, terrorism soon gained the 
recognition that Cold War ideological and political squabbles prevented it from gaining-a 
pernicious and underestimated threat to international peace and security. 
There is no doubt that terrorism is an evil that States should combat aggressively. Terrorism 
aims at killing the innocent and the unarmed. It has no ethics or conscience. Nonetheless, it 
should not be forgotten that countries have many tools they can use in their fight against 
terrorism including covert actions, and a variety of economic sanctions against a state or 
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8group that supports terrorists.17 These sanctions include freezing assets, denying credit or 
investment funds to countries supporting terrorists, and working with multilateral banks to 
block loans. 
The author is inclined to concur with Joseph Thomas’ observation that the rise and threat 
posed by international terrorism is the third world war which is upon us in all its ferocity. It 
may be a war without end, but it should be fought with courage.18 However it is his belief 
that: “This war calls for merciless punitive action, not thoughtless murders,”19 which the 
author takes issue with. Massive military force however selectively and carefully carried out 
will always lead to mistakes and the mistakes will inevitably be counted in numerous 
unnecessary deaths of innocent civilians. As Professor Christopher Blakesley cautions: “Care 
must be taken to ensure that international and domestic action taken to obtain justice and to 
prosecute perpetrators does not fall into the same trap that ensnared those who committed the 
crimes. If we allow ourselves to descend to simple vengeance, we are lost.”20
Terrorists are elusive and more so when States turn their back on their international 
responsibilities and obligations and grant them save havens and support. However, these 
failings do not justify a resort to vigilante justice. Unilateral solutions fuelled by nationalistic 
agendas are bound to tear the fabric of restraint that is central to the international regime on 
the use of force. It is all too easy to reach the simple solution of eliminating the enemy but 
much harder to practically implement without the use of raw military power and thus a move 
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9to centralise power as a medium of international relations. Such a move ensures that 
inevitably international rule of law becomes part of the casualty toll.21
Changing Gear without Engaging International law
The devastating consequences of the attacks of September 11 led President George Bush Jr to 
declare a “war” on terrorism. The first stage of this war was a full-scale military operation in 
Afghanistan, which destroyed the Taliban and Al Qaeda as fighting forces, and replaced the 
Taliban regime with an internationally approved transition government. But the United States
was soon squandering the legal and political capital when it turned its focus on Iraq. 
“Operation Iraqi Freedom” generally lacked support by the UN and most sovereign states 
including some key traditional US allies. 
The rapid fizzling of international support for the “Operation Iraqi” despite the abundance of 
the same when the United States launched “Operation Enduring Freedom” against 
Afghanistan was premised on what was viewed as a lack of appreciation by the United States 
of the complications to the international system that this engendered. This was more so 
considering that the United States had flagged that it was embarking on a new and
dramatically different policy in dealing with terrorism than it has followed for many years.22
In his first Union of the Speech address after the September 11 terrorist attacks, Mr Bush’s 
bellicose remarks regarding the “axis of evil” raised international concerns that the war on 
terrorism may spread in terms of geography and nature. The international community 
(including United States’ allies) “… reacted with alarm and repudiation, fearing that the 
president’s rhetoric signalled a unilateral escalation of global tension. They also objected to 
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the overall mood of the address, and in particular, the pugnacious way in which President 
Bush promised to deal with those who threatened American security.”23  One-by- one foreign 
leaders scolded the United States for its defiant, go-it alone attitude.24 Sensing the Bush 
administration’s heightened interest in Iraq, the EU, China, Russia, and Germany warned the 
United States not to attack Iraq without first working through international diplomatic 
channels.25 The appeals by the international community however fell on deaf years. This was 
not surprisingly since President Bush’s September 12, 2002 address to the UN General 
Assembly, a year after the September 11 bombings had set the terms of the debate.26 In that 
address, “[r]emarkably, Bush succeeded both in flashing his multilateralist credentials and in 
portending the death of multilateralism if the UN failed to follow the American lead.”27
It wasn’t lost on the international community that the Bush Administration was increasingly 
gravitating towards unilateralism and a nationalistic agenda evidenced by the administration’s 
rejection of several international agreements resulting in feverish charges, especially from 
allies abroad, that the United States was behaving unilaterally.28 “The administration’s critics 
argued that American unilateralism endangered the global cooperation that is the only means 
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through which common problems can be solved and common interests advanced. The 
uncompromising rhetoric used by the president and other [US] government leaders in 
describing how the United States would confront Iraq—with or without allied support—
provided more ammunition for those who denounced the Bush administration’s perceived 
unilateralism.”29 The belligerence in the rhetoric of the Bush administration (especially in 
light of United States’ military might) painted a troubling picture of not allowing its agenda to 
be deterred or diluted by the strictures of international law or the preferences of the 
international community. If allies agree with the United States position, they should join the 
crusade; if not, the implication is that they are soft on terrorism and off course for states 
outside the close circle—sympathisers.
Marginalising the UN and International Law? 
It is abundantly clear that the push for a state-centric determination on the use of lethal 
military force to counter terrorism is exerting tremendous stress on international cooperation 
and goodwill and contributing to mounting anti-American sentiment. It is significant that in a 
break with the past, a justification under law was not part of the Bush Administration’s public 
position when it began discussing an invasion of Iraq.30 Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell 
observes that: “This is one of the rare occasions since the adoption of the UN Charter that the 
United States has been so disinterested in international law as to not provide an explanation as 
to how a major use of armed force would comply with the law.”31 Professor O’Connell then 
sums up the matter thus:
29
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The significance of this is not that the United States has always acted consistently with international 
law and now suddenly it is not. The United States has plainly violated international law on the use of 
force in the past. The difference is that now the prevailing view sees no need to offer explanations. 
The United States need not show how it has acted consistently with the principles of the community. 
The United States is above the law. That is a significant departure from the past that may well have 
serious negative consequences for future legal restraints on the use of force.32
In the invasion of Iraq, US planners give little indication that they were concerned with the 
law of self-defence. “In the past the United States has sought to characterise its uses of force 
as within the international rule of law - even if that meant manipulating facts as in the cases of 
Vietnam and Grenada. The United States has officially argued its uses of force were lawful. 
The invasion of Iraq, however, presents a significant new development in which it seems 
some United States foreign policy planners apparently believe that the United States has a 
privileged, exceptional position in international relations and that puts it above international 
law.33
The stance that no multilateral organisation authorisation or other justification under law to 
invade Iraq was necessary will have profound consequences if permitted to be the guiding 
principle of the United States in its crusade against terror.  The most powerful country on 
earth cannot afford to be solely preoccupied with self-preservation.34 Undoubtedly, the United 
States enjoys a position of preponderant military, economic and political might and privilege 
in the international community. “America is no mere international citizen. It is the dominant 
power in the world, more dominant than any since Rome. Accordingly America is in a 
position to reshape norms, alter expectations and create new realities.”35 But this surely does 
not entail tearing apart the international framework and unravelling many decades of hard 
32
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won battles to discipline sovereign excesses. If this be so, Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell 
notes that:
Allowing the United States to move to a position above the law will have repercussions for the law. 
Those repercussions will unlikely be the ones the United States wants. The United States wants an 
orderly world under the rule of law for everyone, but some also want the United States to have a right 
to pick and choose the rules it obeys. This is not how law works. Law is based on a psychological 
element of belief and commitment. When these are absent, there can be no law. If the United States 
breaks this fiction and declares itself above the law, it will help break down the commitment to law 
generally in the international community.36
Resort to force, even when lawful requires great care. Mistakes or excessive collateral damage 
can undermine its effectiveness. “While the United States may act unilaterally in its self-
defence, it must be prepared to defend its actions or to admit and pay for its mistakes.”37 But 
such mistakes (likely to be colossal as Iraq demonstrates) will result in undermining rather 
than furthering the crusade against terrorism. Opponents of an independent right for states to 
determine the use of military force outside the dictates of the UN Charter as a counter 
measure against terrorism criticise the proposition as an imprudent expansion of the legitimate 
use of force with limitless potential for misuse. These opponents echo the fears expressed by 
the International Court of Justice over fifty years ago in the Corfu Channel case: 
[The ICJ] can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force 
such as has in the past given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot find a place in 
international law. It is still less admissible in the particular form it would take here—it would be 
reserved for the most powerful states.38
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan echoed this position in 1999 when he commented that 
“enforcement actions without Security Council authorisation threaten the very core of the 
international security system founded on the Charter of the United Nations. Only the Charter 
36
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provides a universally accepted legal basis for the use of force.”39 It may be prudent for self-
defence not to expand so rapidly that it erases the preclusion of unilateral recourse to armed 
force. After all, as Professor Schachter observes, “[t]he absence of binding judicial or other 
third-party determinations relating to the use of force adds to the apprehension that a more 
permissive rule of self-defence will open the way to further disregard of the limits on force.”40
As Professor Byers and Simon Chesterman observe: 
a select group of states (such as Western liberal democracies, or perhaps the United States alone) 
agreeing on criteria [for intervention] amongst themselves—would seriously undermine the current 
system of international law: It would also greatly undermine the position of the United Nations as an 
effective organisation in the field of peace and security, after the decade in which, despite some 
obvious failures, it achieved more than in the previous half-century.41
“The Bush Doctrine, perceiving the failure of deterrence to inhibit terrorists and ‘rogue’ states 
that possess the will and the means to wreak catastrophic destruction, avers that the terrorist 
threat has become an overriding threat to national survival that trumps existing international 
law. The United States feels it cannot afford to let terrorists have any safe harbour from which 
to craft a future catastrophic attack on America.”42 The United States is forceful in averring 
that  ... “[t]he war on terror will not be won on the defensive.”43 What the United States seems 
to be ignoring or giving scant attention is the fact that “… the Article 2(4) prohibition is not a 
one-sided provision that hampers only the United States policy; it applies to all members of 
the United Nations. Accordingly, an erosion of the prohibition on the use of force enables not 
39 Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organisation, UN GAOR, 54th Sess, Supp No 1, para 66, 
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40
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only the United States, but also all other states to use force more freely.”44 United States 
policymakers, perhaps considering other states too weak to exploit the new principles it seeks 
to write into the rule book for the use of force may be willing to tolerate this situation. 
Though the military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq have from a technical point of view 
“been fought and won, a battle still rages over the legitimacy of the United States’ actions 
under international law. As the world hegemon, the actions of the United States receive a 
great deal of attention.”45 The United States chose not to act within the parameters of 
international law when it invaded Iraq without proper authority leaving the international 
community angry and frustrated. It did not help that the action occurred in the shadow of 
lowered world opinion of the United States due to its unilateral moves regarding the 
environment and missile defence.46 The invasion of Iraq served only to reinforce the fears that 
the international community had of a hyper-power determined to have its way whether 
through law or simply raw power.
The anger of the international community was not based on any support for Saddam regime 
which the international community was well aware supported terror in one form or another. 
Rather it was premised on the United States determination to invade Iraq based on faulty and 
dodgy intelligence which served to undermine the United States claim of a right to act 
unilaterally against Saddam’s regime on behalf of the interests of the international 
community. In essence the United States seemed fixated with the need to get rid of the 
murderous regime—not a bad mindset—but disturbing when it sought to wrap up its political 
44
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agenda together with the interests of the international community. The spill over effect is that 
it opened the door to other countries to justify violating the law in the same manner-by tying 
the interests of the international community together with national foreign policy goals. Thus, 
this move by the United States could unwittingly establish a dangerous precedent. 
The Future
The events of September 11 establish that terrorism poses the most serious threat to 
international order and global human rights in the 21st century. Terrorism also represents a 
grave crime under international law. The war on terror has the UN Charter regime on the use 
of force enrolled in an era of change. Within the United Nations regime-the system of 
collective security, self-defence is subject to restrictions (in other words is finite). The “Bush 
Doctrine” and similar doctrines or justifications are running against the grain of Article 2(4). 
Considering that an amendment to the UN Charter is near impossible, a change in customary 
law might be a way. As Professor M Bothe points out, “[a] usual procedure to modify 
customary law is to break it and to accompany the breach by a new legal claim.”47 The case 
for a change of the restrictive concept of pre-emptive self-defence is made by the National 
Security Strategy:
Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive 
posture. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and the 
magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not 
permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first.48
The argument that a state cannot wait to absorb a potential legal attack before acting is not 
new. Indeed, the traditional approach has always had the drawback of depriving a potential 
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victim of the possibility to choose the most advantageous moment to fight a danger which 
may be extreme. It has been used by Israel to justify a number of incursions into the territory 
of its neighbours, and has been rejected by the Security Council.49 The prohibition of the use 
of force, including the prohibition of anticipatory self-defence, has developed in international 
practice and doctrine despite the awareness of this drawback. “Does President Bush’s 
National Security Strategy constitute a step in this direction?”50 Any new rule to be created 
would have to give an adequate answer to many thorny questions. Professor M Bothe raises 
some of these questions thus:
How to define and limit a possibly expanded right of self-defence? How serious must the threat be? Is 
possession of weapons of mass destruction enough? Who is threatened and who may attack? What 
about the possession of nuclear arms by India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel? What precisely 
distinguishes them (if there is a difference), in legal terms, from Iraq? What does ‘harbouring’ 
terrorists mean? There must be knowledge. But if there is, what kind of effort is a state required to 
make in order not to be considered as harbouring terrorists?51
Satisfactory answers to these questions are not at hand. All too easily, a standard of 
reasonableness boils down to subjectivity and speculation. The National Security Strategy 
seems to recognise the dilemma, in particular the risk of abuse: “... nor should nations use pre-
emption as a pretext for aggression.”52 This sentence is followed, however, by a somewhat 
enigmatic postulate: “Yet in an age where the enemies of civilisation openly and actively seek 
the world’s most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers 
gather”.53
The prickly issue is whether this seems to imply a differentiation between (other) “nations” 
and the United States? And thus seek to create a different yardstick for the world’s sole 
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superpower. An essential argument for maintaining the restrictive concept is the problem of 
vagueness and the possibility of abuse since this is the greatest vulnerability of the prohibition 
of the use of force. The impossibility of placing any legal limit on the exception means that 
the validity of the prohibition of the use of force itself will be in jeopardy. 
The attempt to create a rule which is unable to give a workable definition of permissible force 
might end in the abolition of the prohibition of the use of force altogether, as previously 
occurred. This would mean destroying one of the most important and salutary cultural and 
political achievements of the 20th century. That danger is all the more real as the rule 
prohibiting the use of force is particularly vulnerable for another reason as well. This rule was 
not really developed by state practice. There has never been a consistent practice of abstention 
from the use of force. What changed after World War I was the reaction of relevant actors 
against the use of force.
If we want to maintain international law as a restraint on the use of military force, we should 
very carefully watch any attempt on the part of opinion leaders to argue that military force is 
anything other than an evil that has to be avoided. The lessons of history are telling. If we 
revert to such broad concepts, such as the just war concept, to justify military force we are 
stepping on a slippery slope, one which would make us slide back into the 19th century when 
war was not illegal.
It is important that states remember that despite the weaknesses and perceived failings of the 
UN in dealing with terrorism, the UN is not sitting on its hands. Even before the September 
11 attacks, when the UN General Assembly adopted the Millennium Declaration it among 
other things urged a concerted action against international terrorism by states as well as their 
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accession to all relevant international conventions.54 About a year later, on 28 September 
2001, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council adopted Resolution 
1373, reaffirming its unequivocal condemnation of September 11 attacks.55 The resolution 
also established the Counter-Terrorism Committee to monitor the implementation of 
resolution 1373 by all States and spearhead attempts to increase the capability of States to 
fight terrorism. Shortly thereafter, at the behest of the Secretary-General in October 2001 the 
Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism was established. Its purpose has 
been to identify the longer-term implications and broad policy dimensions of terrorism for the 
United Nations and to formulate recommendations on the steps that the United Nations 
system might take to address the issue. 
It may well be that the international community is committed to reshaping the paradigm on 
the use of force to counter terrorism and will one day accept some instances of pre-emptive 
use of force. This it is submitted, is a much safer approach to the interpretation and 
development of the jus ad bellum than loosening any real restraint by boiling it down to a rule 
of reason—a self-destructive mechanism for the prohibition of the use of force. While there 
are serious doubts about the wisdom of the traditional rule which strictly limits anticipatory 
self-defence, practicable substantive legal restraints on the use of pre-emptive force are not 
readily available. Loosening these limits without setting out workable limits is dangerous. 
Conclusion
Despite the horror of September 11, the “Bush Doctrine”, if taken to its logical conclusion, is 
too all-encompassing to conform to even an expansive reading of the UN Charter. No doubt 
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the September 11 terrorist attacks reinforced the proposition that the UN Charter system is ill-
equipped to deal with contemporary security threats. However part of the problem is a result 
of the Cold War and the obstructionist politics that accompanied it.56 Despite instances of 
resort to military action to counter terrorism in the Cold War, the actions were often shrouded 
in a jumble of half-truths not helped by a confusing mish-mash of legal justifications. The end 
result is that the illusion of self-defence was (and still is) used and misused preventing the 
evolution of any meaningful state practice and opinio juris thus retarding the development of 
meaningful international discourse.
“Antiterrorism efforts must ultimately be judged by whether they prevent attacks. Any 
conceivable deterrent effect of criminal prosecutions of low-level conspirators is lessened by 
the fact that they take years to complete and may take place after additional attacks. Law 
enforcement activity cannot be expected to shut down terrorist organisations operating in 
hostile and uncooperative states…”57 It is a reality that criminal prosecutions are generally 
ineffective in deterring fundamentalist terrorist groups able to recruit individuals willing to 
sacrifice their lives in suicide bombings. These terrorists are crazed killers, as prepared for 
sacrifice as good soldiers.58 However n the face of the ever present reality that “Al Qaeda and 
similar organisations limit the damage any individual can inflict by functioning in loose-knit 
cells,”59 the fight against terrorism cannot be won purely by force or by causing the other side 
an unacceptable rate of casualties. Professor Christopher Blakesley cautions:
International and domestic law equip us to extricate ourselves from the ‘infernal dialect’ of violence; 
they provide the means whereby we may avoid accepting or participating in the oppression or the 
slaughter of innocents, even by our own acquiescence. It is error of the highest order to accept the 
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ideologue’s argument that, because some nations or rebel groups participate in oppression or other 
terror-violence, it is inevitable and therefore necessary to combat it with like conduct. It is practical 
and necessary to alter this vision. To commit evil acts because of perceived or even actual evil acts 
perpetrated by the object of our acts is to accept the evil as ours and to become evil. Self-defence 
under the rule of law does not include the use of innocents as tools. We must re-establish the vision of 
a world made up of human beings controlled by the rule of law and morality, not by raw power.60
The current climate dictates that there is a need “… to realign the existing rules on the use of 
force to match the altered international security environment and yet maintain meaningful 
limits on the use of force.”61 Viable solutions can be reached but only by States maintaining 
the centrality of the UN even in the face of unconventional threats.
The UN is well aware that it will remain relevant if it explores and develops new avenues for 
dealing with the threat of international terrorism. Obviously measures from another era that 
simply impose a limit on the use of force that frustrates a nation’s ability to defend itself will 
result in the UN being marginalised as states will fall back on the expansive right of self-
preservation and inevitably place their own survival above adherence to an international law 
system that cannot guarantee their security and the safety of their citizens. The signs from the 
UN are good, patience and support for its efforts is what is needed.
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